Srebrenica - The Genocide That Was Not Prevented

Different Dutch … would probably have prevented the Srebrenica genocide

• ‘Dutchbat did not react alert: evacuation became deportation’

• ‘Dutch government failed to bring “solidarity in linked destiny” into practice’

• ‘A parliamentary inquiry about Srebrenica is necessary’

The Srebrenica genocide could probably have been prevented if the Dutch government and the Dutch battalion (Dutchbat) would have reacted differently before and after the fall of the enclave. This is the conclusion of the Interchurch Peace Council (in Dutch: Interkerkelijk Vredesberaad; IKV) in its brochure ‘Srebrenica. The genocide that was not prevented’. The IKV has drawn this conclusion on the base of many interviews with directly involved persons and documents that have never been made public before.

On the 11th of July 1995, the enclave Srebrenica, an official safe area of the UN, fell in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. During the following days, more than 7.500 Muslims, men and boys, were killed. According to the IKV, there were at least three moments when Dutchbat and the Dutch government could have acted differently. ‘Alternatives were possible, which, if chosen, might have led to a very different outcome: less cruel, no genocide.’

After the fall, Dutchbat failed to take the opportunity to organize the evacuation itself

The evening of the fall of the enclave, on the 11th of July 1995, the Bosnian-Serb General Mladic offered the UN, in the person of Dutchbat Commander Karremans, the opportunity to organize the evacuation of the circa 20.000 Muslims who stayed in and around the Dutchbat compound in Srebrenica. The separation of men and women would have been prevented by an internationally organized evacuation. The men, who were hiding themselves in the forests, would have had a chance to join the evacuation and in this was stay out of the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. The same evening, Karremans discussed with the Dutch General Nicolai the suggestion Mladic had done (‘Can the UN arrange the buses?’). High military officials [of the ministry of Defense] also knew about the situation. But they didn’t use this opportunity. The next morning, Mladic started arranging the evacuation himself. It turned into a deportation, men and boys were separated from the women. The men in the forests were dislodged, brought together at a few locations and were killed between the 14th and 17th of July.

The Dutch government did not put its aim of ‘solidarity in linked destiny’ into practice

In a meeting on the evening of the 11th of July, the Dutch government decided to act in the policy line of ‘solidarity in linked destiny’ (in Dutch: lotsverbondenheid). They realized that Muslims, especially the men, were in greatest danger. By linking the destiny of the Muslims with that of Dutchbat, their safety should be guaranteed. It would have been logic to let as many men as possible still enter the compound. That afternoon Dutchbat had only led in half of the Muslims who had come to the compound. The Dutch government should have stated that Dutchbat wouldn’t leave Srebrenica, as long as there was no clarity about the destiny of the men and boys of Srebrenica. Minister Van Mierlo (foreign affairs) followed this line and tried to mobilise international support for it. However, minister Voorhoeve (defence) didn’t give Dutchbat the order to put the policy into practise. For him, safe departure of Dutchbat had first priority. Prime minister Kok failed to direct the situation and supported Voorhoeve. Because of this, two days later on the 13th of July, the people who stayed at the compound were sent away by Dutchbat. This happened while Dutchbat knew about the destiny of the men and boys. The policy of solidarity in linked destiny therefore stayed a hollow phrase.

Dutchbat gave up the enclave without any resistance

It’s a fact that the Dutch blue-helmets gave up the enclave without a single shot. The chance that the enclave would have fallen in the hands of the Bosnian Serbs, would have been smaller if Dutchbat would have really fought (like the French and English did in the safe areas they bare responsibilities for). This is even more striking, concerning the following facts. Dutchbat and The Hague (the government and the ministry of defence) knew that air support would only be given under specific circumstances: in case Dutchbat would be under attack and would not have the military means to defend itself on the ground. Without active military defence, the chance to get air support was in fact nil.

Moreover: one month before the fall of the enclave, Dutchbat commander Karremans and the leaders of the local Muslim army agreed to defend the enclave together. In the crucial days of the attack on the enclave, Dutchbat didn’t fullfill this promise.

A parliamentary inquiry is necessary

Dutchbat failed to defend the enclave and to protect the Muslims and the Dutch government attached a greater value to the life of the Dutch blue-helmets than to the safety of the Muslims, who were dependent on them. According to the IKV, a parliamentary inquiry about Srebrenica is necessary because actors involved can be questioned/heard under oath and more than that, because political concequences can be formulated for and by the parliament. This demand supports the ‘Campaign for Truth and Justice’, which the survivors of Srebrenica have led for years. Since 1995 the IKV has closely cooperated with these groups. The IKV thinks that in the parliamentary inquiry a good form must be found to hear the survivors as well.

The IKV pleads that the Dutch government, on behalf of the whole Dutch population, accepts responsibility for the mistakes which have also been made by the Dutch actors (in Srebrenica and The Hague), and that the Dutch government therefore apologizes to the survivors and relatives of the victims.

According to the IKV, the parliament will have to accept the consequences concerning those who were politically and military responsible for the mistakes made. Thirdly, the IKV considers it necessary that several policy measures are formulated. These should contain, amongst others, extended support programs for relatives of killed and missing persons, and a process of recompensation for relatives and victims.

The Hague, March 27, 2002

The brochure ‘Srebrenica. The genocide that was not prevented’ can be found on the website of the IKV: www.ikv.nl

The IKV organizes several activities in order to present the main conclusions of the brochure and to stimulate the public and political debate.