The end of the war is not a day nearer

... a government directive was issued in February 1942 'to destroy the morale of the enemy civilian population and, in particular, of the industrial worker.' This directive did not result - as was often claimed - from the desire to end the war as quickly as possible by means of heavy bombing; instead it was considered the only possible way to influence the course of the war at all. The criticism of the ruthless programme of destruction - also with regard to one's own casualties - that was later made was mainly directed against the fact that this destruction still continued even when much more precise, selective attacks had already become possible - for example against ball bearing factories or oil and fuel installations, transport junctions and headquarters. Such air strikes could have very quickly brought about paralysis of the complete production system - as Albert Speer notes in his memoirs. The critics of this bombing offensive also point out that - as early as in the spring of 1944 - it had become obvious that in spite of the incessant air raids the morale of the German population appeared unbroken, the industrial production only marginally restricted and the end of the war not one day nearer.

Sebald, Luftkrieg und Literatur, p. 24f

Against the civilian population

In contrast to the mainly passive reactions of the Germans to the destruction of their cities which they regarded as an unavoidable disaster, the destruction programme had been the subject of heated debate in Britain. The accusation that the strategy of directing the air raids primarily against the civilian population could not be justified, either morally or legally, was not only repeatedly and insistently made by Lord Salisbury as well as George Bell, Bishop of Chichester in the House of Lords, but also by the general public. Even the responsible military establishment was divided over the assessment of this new form of warfare. The ambivalent assessment of this extermination battle became even more pronounced after Germany's unconditional surrender. The more pictures and reports on the effects of the bombings that began to be published in England, the more the disgust grew at what one had done, so to speak, blindly. 'In the safety of peace,' Max Hastings wrote, 'the bombers' part in the war was one that many politicians and civilians would prefer to forget.'

Sebald, Luftkrieg und Literatur, p. 22