'Advance Force' Operations in Light of Sophisticated Foreign Denial-of-Access Strategies and Technologies

There is a passage in Graham Greene’s far-sighted 1955 novel about Viet Nam, entitled The Quiet American, which may touch us, as it did the French, in light of what later also happened to us in Viet Nam. For, we, too, must now face the uncertainty and perfidy of purported allies.

Speaking of the syncretic religion, Caodaism, which was “the invention of a Cochin civil servant, …[and] a synthesis of the three religions”--Buddhism, Confucianism, and Christianity--Graham Greene speaks of their seeming military alliance with the French:

How could one explain the dreariness of the whole business:the private army of twenty-five thousand men, armed with mortars made out of the exhaust-pipes of old cars, allies of the French who turned neutral at the moment of danger?[1]

Adding, with further irony, a depiction of their cunning and corruption, Graham Greene says: “It was always a day of some anxiety for the French High Command [enroute to the Caodaists’ capital city of Tanyin, eighty kilometers to the north-west of Saigon] and perhaps a certain hope for the Caodaists, for what could more painlessly emphasize their loyalty to the French, than to have a few important guests shot outsidetheir territory.”[2]

Furthermore, says the narrator of The Quiet American:

After the parade [at the “Holy See at Tanyin”] I interviewed the Pope’s deputy [i.e., the second most important authority in the Caodaist Hierarchy]…. He wore a long white soutane and he chain-smoked. There was something cunning and corrupt about him: the word “love” occurred often. I was certain he knew that all of us were there to laugh at his movement; our air of respect was as corrupt as his phoney hierarchy, but we were less cunning. Our hypocrisy gained us nothing--not even a reliable ally, while theirs had procured arms, supplies, even cash down.[3]

As we in the U.S. Special Operations Command now consider our own strategic--and even grand-strategic--“advance force” operations in foreign lands and amidst alien syncretic cultures and religions, we, too, must be attentive and discerningly prudent about our seemingly trustworthy “coalitions” and “alliances” and “friends.”

Remembering also the story from our youth about how the Lone Ranger and Tonto were isolated together and surrounded by hostile and perfidious Indians heading toward them from all four directions, we may also recall what the Lone Ranger said to Tonto. “Tonto, we’re in trouble!” Tonto (unlike Cervantes’ loyal squire, Sancho Panza, toward Don Quixote!) said: “What do you mean ‘we,’ White Man?” Very suddenly the Lone Ranger realized his further aloneness and loneliness, and it was not a propitious moment to have discovered this sad and perilous fact.

Professor Samuel Huntington, speaking of the current and deepening clash of alien cultures and civilizations, now, more and more, even speaks of us as “The Lonely Superpower.” Moreover, he says, we in the U.S. can only really gather “an Anglo-Saxon posse” to help us, and then only intermittently and unperseveringly. And you will notice that he does not include our “friends” the Israelis in this sporadically supportive, strategic “posse,” much less in a more abiding “strategic alliance.” This is a very significant omission on Professor Huntington’s part, and not accidental, I think. But, now what? Who are our reliable allies for our forward basing and satellite “downlinks,” and for our various “advance force” operations?

Who are our trustworthy supports in the “Global War on Terrorism” who will allow us to have and preserve “advance force” operations and emplacements, even covert ones? In light of the global scope and range of our various missions in this ongoing and protracted new cultural-religious war, how should we soberly and strategically assess the reliability and manifold suitability of “advance force” locations and their supporting “infrastructure.” And, how will they allow and sustain our subsequent conduct of resourceful, and very timely, responsive operations?

For example, given our current “forward bases and forward operations” in the Persian Gulf, to what extent can we trust even Qatar, upon whom we had so relied and upon whom we have become quite dependent? A recent article (24 October 2002) by the well-respected and usually trustworthy Strategic ForecastingGroup in Austin, Texas may give us pause, as well as the promptness to re-consider our precarious assumptions. The “Stratfor” essay is entitled, ”Qatar Coup Plot May Thwart U.S. War Plans.”[4]

The essay raises--but cannot yet answer--two important questions: 1) “How serious was the coup plot?”; and 2) “To what degree, if any, was Saudi Arabia involved in the plot?” As to the second question, Stratfor says:

The Saudi government has been incensed not only by Doha’s [the Qatar capital’s] liberal social reforms, but also by its close cooperation with the United States. After officials in Riyadh said they would refuse Washington use of their air bases for an attack on Iraq, the U.S. military re-located supplies and equipment from Prince Sultan air base in Saudi Arabia to al-Udeid air base in Qatar. Tensions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar came to a boil at the end of September, when Riyadh recalled its ambassador from Doha.[5]

Indeed, the “foiled coup plot in Qatar raises questions about the ability of the government in Doha to survive, and with that about the U.S. access [much less sustained presence!] to the massive al-Udeid air base.”[6] And what about our larger access outside of the air base?

In the phrase “We the coalition” or “We the allies,” who is “we,” and for how long? And, given our impatience and illusions, are we being lured into a trap? Building upon our own self-deception, is a strategic deception being practiced (or being prepared) against us?

Although there were, according to Stratfor, “allegations that some of the plotters were directly linked to al-Qaeda,” their own sources (though unspecified) “agree that their goal was to change Qatar’s foreign policy--which now allows U.S. troops use of bases in Qatar--in favor of anunspecified ‘pan-Arab and Islamic cause’.”[7] And how many more are indirectly linked to al-Qaeda? Or, as is the case with even the Shi`tes of eastern Saudi Arabia, how many in Qatar are, at least, very sympathetic to al-Qaeda, just for standing up to the uppity and intrusive U.S.?!

Developing their further analysis to include the longer-range implications, Stratfor goes on to say:

Finally, what does word of the foiled coup plot do to U.S. plans in the region? Can Washington count on Qatar as a base for military operations against Iraq [or against anybody else!]? And, if not, can war plans proceed at all? …. [Even] a significant change in timing for any attack on Iraq could have major economic repercussions…. The pain could be particularly acute for producers of consumables [sic] like munitions, food, medicine, fuel, and logistical support…. Key bases for the operation [and for our strategic presence]keep coming into question. Saudi Arabia staunchly refusesto allow the use of its bases for a war. Turkey [our NATO ally!] is expressing concern over the post-war status of Iraq’s Kurds and arguing against a war. The U.S. Marines were fired upon in Kuwait, a country formerly believed to be a reliable and secure ally. And now Qatar, a bastion [sic] of U. S. war plans, has faced a coup plot. [And what about Oman and the United Arab Emirates?][8]

Stratfor goes on to reveal and to confirm that “Kuwait remains under threat of a pro-al-Qaeda fifth column.” (Recently, moreover, a Kuwaiti policeman stopped two U.S. soldiers on the road and shot them at point blank range, even in the face, and then fled into Saudi Arabia where he was captured and turned over to U.S. authorities, who had already reported that the soldiers were, indeed, seriously wounded, but not killed.) Furthermore, Stratfor would argue:

Jordan’s resistance to the war will stiffen if Doha sides with Riyadh, taking its bases out of consideration. And even if it grudgingly accedes to the war plan [after also getting very much money from us], Turkey simply does not have the bases and logistics networks to host 100 percent of the war effort [sic]…. Unless and until the Qatari government regains [sic] confidence in its security, a U.S. war on Iraq may be delayed indefinitely.[9]

And what about the cumulative consequences of these uncertainties upon our long-range and likely protracted “global war on terrorism,” which will inescapably involve us not only in the Muslim world, but also in the perilous and perfidious world of Zionism?! What does this portend our for “the Emerging American Imperium” and for our strategic “counter-terrorist forces”?

The preceding words of this essay, to include the wise analytical insights of Stratfor, are intended to be cautionary remarks, lest we become prematurely over-extended. With the true cardinal virtue of prudence, we must discern and perseveringly resist those who would flatter our pride and also manipulate our discernable self-deceptions. Both of these methods of deception and manipulation have been lucidly (and very cynically) articulated by Bernard de Mandeville (in the 18th Century) and by Saul Alinsky, William Kunstler, and Antonio Gramsci (in the 20thCentury), all of whom so well understood “political jiu-jitsu” and “the Long March through the Institutions” as part of a long-range indirect revolutionary strategy to subvert and “capture” the culture.[10] The Muslim world itself now recognizes what “the West” has done to them with our own subversive cultural warfare. For example, see David Rieff’s shameless proclamation of this fact, in his essay for the Washington Post (2 January 1994), entitled “The Culture That Conquered The Earth: Why Conformist Consumerism Is America’s Greatest Export.” Rieff openly calls himself a “Liberal Imperialist” and thinks that America should develop, even moreso, into a responsible “Liberal Empire,” although he sees that we are reluctant to do so.[11] Many of the Muslims, therefore, and very understandably, would now like to do the same thing against us, and ardently exploit our own internal cultural divisions, or “cultural Balkanization.” For, the West is hardly unified culturally.

In fact, a recent article by a very intelligent scholar and columnist, Paul Craig Roberts, will confirm our own multi-cultural fragmentation or “Balkanization,” and will provide other sobering insights of truth especially pertinent to our current strategic context of conflict, both our actual war and ourimpending wars.

Paul Craig Roberts’ short, admonitory essay is entitled, “A Leap into the Dark.”[12] His evocative title is symbolic, and intentionally suggests a parable, in order to warn and illuminate President Bush himself about his own current war plans concerning a wider Mid-East war, and thereby to correct him and to shape the President’s impending and irreversible decision for the greater common good. Roberts’ title derives from the critical and warning words of Lord Birkenhead, who once described Britain’s floundering Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, as follows: “He takes a leap in the dark, looks around and takes another.”

We in the U.S. Special Operations Command must never allow this critique to be deservingly applied to us, because we had been so myopic and rash and unstrategic, even in our “advance force” operations abroad. Yet, do we have the patience and discernment to be far-sighted? In our Rapid Decisive Operations, for example, we tend to emphasize the “rapid” part, not the “decisive” part!

But, Paul Craig Roberts’ critique of our foreign policy and grand strategy is even sterner. Are we ready for this? And will we be rationally ready to counter-argue him? For, he says:

The midterm election has given us evil twins--a Department of Homeland Security and a Middle Eastern war…. One hundred government agencies from 22 departments crammed into an unaccountable bureaucracy of 170,000 civil servants creates less security. Many of these agencies have histories of feuding with one another…. Sheer bulk [without an intelligent and coherently purposive grand strategy!] will not cure the federal government’sinability to protect us from terrorists. Prior to 9-11, the INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service] was incapable of keeping Muslim terrorists out of the country. Post 9-11, nothing has changed. Six months after their deaths, the INS issued visas to terrorists who flew the jetliners in to the World Trade Center.[13]

After mentioning some other embarrassing facts, in order to remove our illusions, Roberts concludes by saying that already “the INS is too politically correct to deport known illegals,” but, “once the INS has a 170,000-person bureaucracy in which to hide, the opportunities for passing the buck will be endless.”

Our strategic (and grand-strategic) defense-in-depth of the Nation requires us, especially in our “advance force” emplacements and operations, to correlate the “over there” and the “over here,” and not to divorce the two. But, the “over here” doesn’t look so good! In a counter-intelligence sense, we are “like Swiss cheese”--full of holes.

But, lest we think that Paul Craig Roberts is being too mild and squishy with us, he proceeds to hit us very hard “between the horns,” even if we have a lot of extra bone in our head. He says, for example:

“Homeland Security” is Orwellian. To what homeland does it refer? Americans no longer have a homeland. Deracinated by “multicultural diversity,” and turned into a sanctuary for unassimilable Third World cultures, America is a Tower of Babel.

Then, with a reference to Irving Kristol, William Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Charles Krauthammer, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Pearle, Douglas Feith, George Will--and all-too-many others--Roberts says:

What the neoconservatives pushing Homeland Security and war don’t understand is that our insecurity has as much to do with their policies of multiculturalism, open borders, and total commitment to Israel as it does with Muslim terrorists. Americans are under a greater threat from their own elites, who are determined to destroy or identity with multicultural diversity and mass immigration.

Proceeding to make a deeper strategic point, Roberts says:

Paradoxically, Americans are seeking security by placing themselves under new and dangerous government powers while permitting the Bush administration to foment war in the Middle East. Removing Saddam Hussein achieves no security interest for the United States. Jews mistakenly believe that American aggression against Iraq will increase Israel’s security. Instead, it will stir a hornets’ nest. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq is a secular state. Removing him opens the way for those who want to merge Islam and government. Secular Muslim states are weak, because Muslims are loyal to religion, not to states. Overthrowing states does not overthrow Islam. To the contrary, the mullahs are strengthened by the fall of secular rulers.

And then there is the matter of the political and cultural “re-construction” in the Middle East after a war. And what are the precedents, or applicable “models”?

Instead of his being more cooperative and docile, “What ifin 1945 the Japanese Emperor had said: ‘The Americans havedefeated us with weapons of mass destruction. Now they come to destroy our culture. Reply to them with terror’.”?! Developing this stark contrast, Roberts then continues:

Today, Muslims respond to U.S. military supremacy [and our consumerist, hedonist cultural intrusion!] with terror. Our viceroys in charge of conquered secular states will be assassinated. The large Muslim populations in Europe and the United States providebases [i.e., “advance force” emplacements and operations] for terrorists, whose grievances will mount as Americans extend hegemony in the Middle East.

In this explosive strategic environment, what does it mean for overt and covert U.S. Special Operations Forces to conduct “advance force” operations when there are so many “barriers to entry” for us, strategical and technological and cultural barriers, and not only in the Middle East. Having many limitations on our means, we may well have to re-consider and revise ourends--and thus change our currently over-reaching objectives and unrealistic expectations, especially at this tense time and given the current “correlation of forces.” Moreover, our own Homeland Base is not even under our mastery, and much less is it so that we have strategic mastery of our communications. There seems to be a dangerous “divorce” between our foreign and domestic policy, and between our homeland strategy and our overseas strategy.

Finally in light of Paul Wolfowitz’s recent leak of our covert operations in Yemen[14]--especially those activities that were conducted by CIA--what foreign governments will now trust us to keep secret the fact that they are collaborating with us? And many more Americans who are abroad--even covertly as “sleeper agents” with “non-official covers”--will be more suspect and likely targeted.

All of these factors, cumulatively considered, will require a very cautious and far-sighted strategic and cultural assessment of our short-term and long-term “advance force” operations and networks abroad, so as to enable our deftly responsive “surge capacity.”