Origins of Iraq’s NBC Interests

by Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Washington D.C.

On February 12, during the Senate hearings on terrorism, one of the Senators posed a variety of questions to the heads of CIA, FBI, and DIA. One of these questions was: How did Iraq acquire its interest in nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons?

This was a highly relevant question. It went to the heart of the proliferation problem. If we knew more about the origins of Iraq’s interest, our nation’s strategy for combating terrorism and proliferation could be profoundly affected.

Unfortunately, the question was not answered satisfactorily by any of the heads of the U.S. intelligence agencies.

To understand the reasons why Iraq turned to weapons of mass destruction, we need to go back to the early 1960s. At that time, secret discussions were held between the White House and Israel. From them emerged a U.S. decision to help Israel acquire nuclear weapons. The individual given the responsibility for managing the transfer to Israel was James Jesus Angleton. He was a perfect choice. Angleton was the legendary head of counterintelligence at the CIA. Even more important, at the same time Angleton ran the Israeli desk at the CIA. This desk had been placed under Angleton because of significant intelligence concerns respecting Israel and its intelligence connections to the Soviet Union.

In 1967, Saddam Hussein was deputy chairman of the Ba’ath Party. From his perspective, there were two long-term threats to Iraq. First, there were reports that Israel was developing nuclear weapons. Second, and intensifying the first threat, was the result of the Six-Day War in June when Israel seized the Sinai, the West Bank, and parts of Jordan.

Hussein approached the Soviets and asked for their help in developing Iraq’s nuclear capability. The Soviets considered Hussein’s request and decided that they would not grant it. As a consolation prize, however, they decided to assist Hussein in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. The key challenge addressed in their decision was how to transfer the requisite technology and training so that the Soviet role in the proliferation would be hidden. Their solution was to conduct the transfer through a third country surrogate, a common tactic in Soviet strategy.[1]

To show Hussein the benefits of chemical weapons, regarded as the best place to start, the Soviets invited Hussein and a dozen Iraqi military officers to visit their massive Shikhany chemical warfare facility. Hussein accepted. The Iraqis went to the Soviet Union and were treated to a tour of testing areas as well as to extensive lectures on production, munitions, effects, and military tactics.

The atmosphere Hussein was exposed to throughout this visit must have been charged with enthusiasm and commitment. By 1963, chemical and biological warfare (CBW) had become every bit as important in Soviet strategy as nuclear weapons. CBW were understood to be as powerful as nuclear weapons but without the inherent destruction of property. CBW were regarded as the preferred weapons in the case of war in Europe because they would not destroy the industry that the Soviets wanted to capture intact. CBW were also seen as the best weapons for use in Third World conflicts, such as those Iraq was most likely to become involved in.

Thus, beginning in 1963 there was an immense growth in Soviet CBW activity – new missions, new institutes, new doctrine, and a major growth in funding. In 1965 CBW weapons were first used in military exercises. This was also the time of the beginning of a major growth in R&D whose mission was to develop qualitatively new families of CBW within 20 years. By 1967 the Soviets were in the process of incorporating the use of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) into their plans for war in Europe and of upgrading all their military equipment to include CBW defenses.[2]

It was into this charged environment that Hussein was transported in 1967.

Not to be outdone, in this same year the United States invited Hussein and his key military officers to visit the United States chemical weapons laboratories and test facilities. At Edgewood Arsenal and Aberdeen Proving Grounds, both in Maryland, the Iraqis were briefed on the design of chemical weapons and equipment for chemical defense and decontamination. They next visited the Army chemical school at Ft. McClellan in Alabama to witness military demonstrations and learn about chemical weapons employment , tactics, and defenses. Their tour ended at Dugway, Utah, where they watched the actual firing of live nerve agent artillery shells. As recalled by the scientific director of Dugway at the time, Hussein and his fellow officers were very impressed by what they saw.

This beginning of Iraq’s interest was summarized in an article in Newsday on the eve of the first Gulf War. ‘Iraq’s interest in chemical warfare was a product of the disastrous Arab defeat by Israel in the 1967 Six-Day War and of intelligence reports indicating that Israel had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons.’ In both examples, United States assistance to Israel played a significant role.

Further stimulation was provided in 1981: ‘The Iraqi chemical weapons program was accelerated after the 1981 Israeli bombing raid on the French-built Osirak reactor, which dealt Baghdad’s drive to acquire nuclear weapons a major setback.’[3] The United States assisted the Israelis in this bombing raid. The U.S. contribution was the laser designation that enabled the bombs to hit their target without the usual collateral damage.

Iraqi interests in the toxin and biological warfare areas were likely stimulated at this same time by the Soviet use of toxins and biological weapons in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. These employments were reported on in detail by the U.S. Department of State.[4]

In the years that followed, Iraq received massive technical assistance from Western and Eastern industrial corporations. The countries most noticeable in this regards were Germany, France, Britain, the United States, Japan and a few Scandinavian countries. Massive assistance was also provided by the Soviets acting mainly through surrogates. The Soviets also assisted the Iraqis in obtaining technology from various Western industries, which was an even better cover than the one provided by working through surrogates.

The historical record suggests that the origins of Hussein’s interest in weapons of mass destruction were defensive in nature and were largely stimulated by United States, Soviet, and Israeli actions. Hussein’s acquisition of the production and weapons system technology was enabled mainly by Western Industry (and Japanese as well) with considerable assistance, advice, and training provided by the Soviet Union, mostly well after the arms control treaties on chemical, biological, and toxin warfare were negotiated in the early 1970s.

One can further argue that Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iran in the mid-1980s was defensive in nature and that their attacking Iran was provoked out of fear of Iran and the intentions of its new ‘leader,’ the Ayotollah Koumeini, who hated Hussein for throwing him out of Iraq where he was residing in exile. Even their attack on Kuwait, from Iraq’s perspective, can be justified: first on the basis that Kuwait was previously part of Iraq and second because Kuwait reportedly was slant drilling into Iraq territory in an effort to take oil that belonged to Iraq.

To the extent Iraq poses a threat to peace and stability, it would seem that U.S. foreign aid and military assistance to Israel is as much at fault as Hussein. It is also a fact that the United States has suffered more damage due to intentional Israeli actions (their attack on the USS Liberty) than from Iraq. Which nation has thumbed its nose more at the UN—Iraq or Israel? Which nation is more intimidating in the region and which nation has more right to its stockpile of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons—Iraq or Israel?

Historical perspective can help us better understand motivations and their origins. This knowledge could be critical in devising an appropriate strategy to combat terrorism and, hopefully, better influence prospects for peace. As is evident in the case of President Bush’s National Security Strategy,[5] this type of background information does not appear to have been considered or even wanted and may be one of the reasons why this policy was strongly criticized around the world, including within the citizenry and leadership of our allies.

The new U.S. policy presented in the National Security Strategy was regarded as unquestionably arrogant and imperialistic. There was not a single hint of repentance or any acknowledgement of the role the United States had played in the proliferation process. It also ignores the dominant role of the Soviet Union (Russia) in birthing present-day terrorism and shepherding its growth into a global monster.[6] This and a variety of other ignored historical facts raise questions concerning the real motivations that are driving the war on terrorism not to mention its overall prospects for ‘victory.’

It seems inconceivable that nations around the world, most of whom are knowledgeable about this history, at the very least will not privately view this U.S. policy as not just arrogant and imperialistic, but contrived and grossly hypocritical. 

1 An excellent example of this is their training others to run their terrorist and drug trafficking operations. See Red Cocaine: The Drugging of America.

2 For more detail, see Joseph D. Douglass Jr and Neil C. Livingstone, America the Vulnerable: The Threat of Chemical/Biological Warfare (Lexington, MA: Lexington House, 1987), pp. 43-48.

3 Neil C. Livingstone and Joseph D. Douglass Jr., ‘Iraq Won’t Try Now To Use Its Poison Gas,’ Newsday, August 21, 1990, p. 57.

4 See U.S. Department of State, Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Special Report no. 98, 22 March 1982, and Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan: An Update, Special Report no. 104, November 1982. Although labeled ‘chemical warfare,’ the subject dealt with was clearly ‘chemical, biological, and toxin warfare.’

5 The White House, National Security Strategy, September 17, 2002.

6 Remaining silent about the crimes of Communism, such as international terrorism, has been a centerpiece of Western policy going back eighty years and may itself constitute the greatest atrocity of the past century. As the Black Book of Communism (Harvard University Press, 1999) framed the issue: ‘The extraordinary attention paid to Hitler’s crimes is entirely justified. It respects the wishes of the surviving witnesses, it satisfies the needs of researchers trying to understand these events, and it reflects the desire of moral and political authorities to strengthen democratic values. But the revelations concerning Communist crimes cause barely a stir. Why is there such an awkward silence from politicians? Why such a deafening silence from the academic world regarding the Communist catastrophe, which touched the lives of about one-third of humanity on four continents during a period spanning eighty years?’