War Watch #2

by Joseph D. Douglass Jr., USA

[Note: Take also a look at "War Watch #1" and "War Watch #3 - After Iraq, What?"]

Iraqi military were camouflaging themselves in civilian clothes. Iraqi irregular forces were appearing in many cities and villages. Foreign nationals and irregular forces – Iranians, Syrians, and Saudis – also began appearing. Russia and Syria were found to be assisting in the supply of military materials to Iraq. Turkish forces were gathering at the border, waiting for the right opportunity to move in. Jordanians have also been sighted. Suicide Palestinian bombers are said to be headed to Iraq to attack U.S. forces.

This incipient broadening of the war introduces complications. What happens if the United States ends up in the middle of a general war in the Middle East? Most of the players in the region want to see the United States humbled.

Motivations

Most notable over the past two weeks has been the evident rallying of hundreds of Iraqi civilians living in other countries. They are leaving these countries, especially Jordan, to return to fight for Iraq – not for Hussein but for Iraq.

This may portend a serious change in the war. It appears to have started when the U.S. attack plan began running into trouble. This is when it became evident that the Iraqis could put up a fight and likely were not going to just roll over as had been anticipated by the principal U.S. war planners.

Further insight into what is happening may well be President Bush’s National Security Strategy (NSS). It presents the strategic map for the U.S. war on terrorism. It was approved and distributed in mid-September 2002. It is readily available on the Internet. The Arab nations must have understood its message.

The tone of the NSS is brash and arrogant. This has been noted at home and abroad. The NSS projects a war that extends well beyond the assumed boundaries of the war on terrorism. This may in part explain why President Bush, when offered a Congressional Declaration of War, declined. He already had ample authority, he said. It should now be evident, however, that the real reason may be that he already had other plans. The war on terrorism was just the take-off platform and he did not want to be limited or constrained by a Congressional Declaration of War that logically would have simply focused on the war with Al-Qaeda.

As is stated in the first chapter of the NSS, the war on terrorism presents the United States with “a time of opportunity.” We will “take advantage” of this “historic opportunity,” it says.

“U.S. National Security Strategy,” the document explains, “will be based on a distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests.”

The implications of this internationalism are clear: “We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants [which includes most Middle East countries]. . . Our goals are: political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human dignity.” The last item is further clarified as follows: “We stand firmly for the non-negotiable demands for the role of [secular] law, limits on the power of the state, free speech, freedom of worship, equal justice, respect for women, religious and ethnic tolerance, and respect for private property.” While this may not seem out of order to Americans and most other industrialized nations, it would send a shiver up the spine of the leaders of most Arab states, perhaps deliberately so.

Our enemies in this war are not just the Taliban, who supported Al-Qaeda, but repressive governments everywhere. This is the historic opportunity: to wage war on repression around the globe. “We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world. . . open societies and build the infrastructure of democracy,” presumably as we are planning to do in Iraq. The accompanying global economic growth will benefit all the people and not just the privileged few. This global growth requires, among other conditions, “energy security,” by which is meant OIL.

There is no questioning the serious tone of the Bush Administration National Security Strategy. To implement this strategy, the United States will use its “unparalleled military strength and great economic and political influence.

Middle East regimes are high on the list. Iraq is not the only repressive and intolerant country that is targeted. Most of the Middle East regimes are at risk. Iraq is just the start. The most immediate candidates for action following Iraq are Syria, Iran, and North Korea.

What Seems To Be Happening

There seem to be two strong currents flowing in the Middle East that affect what is happening. First there is hatred for Saddam Hussein. Second is hatred toward any infidel who would dare to invade their lands and change their governments, society and culture, especially an infidel who would want to open their society to all the crime, illegal drugs, pornography, feminism, homosexuality, and government promoted secular humanism, which is how many people in the Arab world see the United States.

Examined in this light, there is an obvious hypothesis that may help explain the developing “complications.” American military might is well recognized and feared. Hussein is strongly disliked, albeit not universally so. Indeed, his popularity, dead or alive, may be growing. Thus, the initial action logically for non-Iraqi Middle East regimes was to wait, watch, and figure out how to protect their interests.

As U.S. forces began running into resistance, those with a vested interest in the region may have sensed an opportunity, if not a necessity, to assert themselves, albeit ever so carefully. The question they likely entertained was whether it might be possible for the United States and Hussein to beat each other up, thus ridding the Middle East of Hussein but leaving an environment that is inundated with suicide bombers and irregular forces that would, in effect, obviate the possibility of planting democracy. As an added benefit, it might be possible to so sour the American public that they would rise up against further attempts by the Bush Administration to spread its “distinctly American internationalism.”

The Middle East regimes do not want Hussein to win, but neither do they want Iraq defeated. The country they want defeated is the United States. The United States has to be defeated because of the clear and present danger it presents to the Middle East regimes and culture as is evident in the new U.S. National Security Strategy.

How can it be otherwise? Syria and Iran are both threatened. Neither can afford a U.S. triumphant win. Both are targets for regime and government change because both are regarded as repressive and terrorist regimes and in pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Saudi Arabia is also in trouble because it is regarded as repressive and as a major sponsor of radical Islam and terrorism. Its critical role in energy security seals its doom.

The U.S. attack may serve the Arabs well by destroying Hussein, his followers, and his military capability. They would like to see this happen, especially if in the process the United States learns that even if it wins, it loses, and does so at great cost. All the countries also know that the only way to achieve the second goal is not by challenging the United States military forces head on, but by the same type of guerrilla and irregular force tactics that were demonstrated in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Israel, and, most of all, Somalia and Mogadishu..

In other words, they may be serious when they “welcome” a war in Baghdad. Their rationale is simple. In the city, guerrillas and irregular forces may have an advantage. They believe it was the unrelenting action of bin Laden and his mujahedin or “bandit gangs” that defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1988 and Mogadishu in 1993.

Hopefully, the analogies will not hold. What worked in Afghanistan may not work in Baghdad, which is considerably more limited. Also, the U.S. military is extremely wary about walking into another Mogadishu trap.

Nevertheless, urban warfare is extremely tough. But then, so is the U.S. military. A big uncertainty is chemical warfare agents. If they are used, and American troops have to operate in CW protective gear, especially wearing gas masks, it will be like fighting with one or two hands tied behind their backs. Let’s hope that does not happen. Bacterial and viral agents, generally ignored as tactical weapons, could also be very useful to the guerrillas and the right ones could be introduced covertly. The remaining unknowns remain massive, even at this late date.

The Future Remains To Be Seen

We will have to wait patiently to see how the war in Baghdad develops. Because of the care required in pursuing the guerrillas, the pace of the war may be very slow, or very fast to overpower the resistance before they can act. Most of the action might be at night, when night vision provides an advantage and temperatures are cooler. In all likelihood, it will be a 24-7 war. But, there is no way of knowing at this time.

In the meantime, download a copy of the National Security Strategy and read it carefully. You may be surprised to see how far it departs from the values and principles our Founding Fathers tried to establish in our Constitution, such as respect for private property, non-intervention in the internal affairs of others, avoiding foreign entanglements, and limiting the war powers of the Executive.