War Watch 4

by Joseph D. Douglass Jr., Washington D.C. [*]

It has often been stated that ”wars solve nothing.”

President Bush is expected soon, perhaps this week, to announce the end of the war. It is, therefore, an appropriate time to re-examine the U.S strategic goals for the war and assess how well they have been met.

There were three stated goals:

• to seize and destroy all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of production
• to capture and hold accountable Saddam Hussein and his top fifty military and party leaders, and
• to affect a regime change.

Goal One: Seize and Destroy All WMD

As of April 27, no evidence that Iraq had WMD stockpiles has been found. Nonetheless, President Bush on April 24 said with conviction, ”It’s going to take time to find them, but we know he had them. And whether he destroyed them, moved them or hid them, we’re going to find out the truth.” Implicity, the possibility that U.S. intelligence was wrong in their assessment, is not an allowable ”truth.”

Finding the truth may not be easy. CIA intelligence on the Middle East has been notoriously bad, as explained by its own former operatives.[1] Thus, the reality may be that the intelligence came not from the CIA but from Israeli intelligence. Their reports would have to be subject to serious questions, however, because Israel’s clear objective has been to cause the United States to attack Iraq and force a regime change favorable to Israel. That is, Israeli intelligence cannot be trusted. As one Israeli explained their happiness with the war, ”Each Arab the United States kills is one less that we have to kill and every American that dies is one less Israeli that has to die.” A second alternative is that the information came from Iraq defectors or recruited agents. This is also very dangerous because the CIA has been a notable embarrassment in its pronounced tendency to recruit and rely upon spies that turn out to have been ”double agents” actually workingfor the enemy. In a re-appraisal of recruited spies in the wake of the Aldrich Ames case, the conclusion reached was that 100 percent of all CIA East German spies were doubled, 100 percent of all CIA Cuban spies were doubled, and 90 percent of all CIA Communist country spies were questionable.

The possibility that Iraq destroyed its WMD just before or during the military conflict, is certainly possible, but this seems unlikely because of the serious disposal problems. Secretary Collin Powell explained to the UN that Iraq had 50 to 100 tons of WMD agents (in particular, nerve agents such as the extremely toxic and persistent U.S. chemical warfare agent VX, and biological warfare agents, such as anthrax and botulinum toxin). Destroying this large quantity of extremely toxic agents in a hurry without causing casualties and accidental releases would presuppose a significant capability beyond even that of the United States, let alone Iraq. Did they just empty the drums underground, and, if so, when? Additionally, there is the small matter of tens of thousands of munitions from artillery shells and mines to rocket warheads, not to mention the drones and other aircraft configured to deliver chemical and biological warfare agents and biological agent production trucks. Were these also destroyed at the last minute and if so, how, without being detected?

In light of the substantial U.S. air and satellite intelligence capabilities, is it any more reasonable to entertain the thought that significant quantities were moved across the border to Syria or Iran preceding or during the war? If so, then this would represent a serious error in the war plans unless the possibility of Hussein and many of his compatriots and WMD escaping to Syria or Iran was deliberately left open in the war plans. There is a plausible reason for doing this: it could be used later to help justify an assault on Syria or Iran. A more palatable reason is that no one wanted to mobilize the total force required to seal the borders, which would have meant perhaps another 50 to 100 thousand trained soldiers and all the airborne reconnaissance systems available. Nevertheless, it could have been done – Iraq is not a jungle environment like Vietnam with politically protected roads like the Ho Chi Min trail.

The third possibility on President Bush’s list is that the stockpiles of agents and munitions were and remain hidden. Still, 50 to 100 tons of agent and tens of thousands of delivery systems occupies a lot of volume. Moving a stockpile of this size is not a relatively simple matter, such as moving some equipment by truck the day before the UN inspectors arrive. Again, the only reasonable assumption is that U.S. intelligence had the whole of Iraq under a surveillance microscope for a year or more before the invasion and certainly during the invasion, night and day. The only activities that would not have been noticed would have been underground activities, and by now we should have hundreds of special force gofers throughout the entire Baghdad rabbit warren. The rest of Iraq outside the cities should have been thoroughly surveyed with earth-penetrating radars and any such stockpiles less than 300 meters deep should already have been pin-pointed. So far, however, there has been no indication that any stockpiles have been located.

The question that arises is precisely how do we know that Hussein had these enormous stockpiles of WMD and yet not have a clue where they are? Were they moved to Syria before 9-11?

There is yet another possibility that has not been mentioned in the public debate. Since the end of the first Gulf War, the main Iraqi effort may have been in developing new agents and in establishing the production techniques and obtaining critical chemical components so that actual agents could be produced later when needed. Producing agents and filling munitions is not advisable in advance unless a surprise major enemy attack is feared. The reason is that agents and/or filled munitions pose problems in storage and moving and especially if they have to disposed of. Why produce them in advance when they can be more easily produced when needed at much lower cost and risk. This is particularly true of biological warfare agents, where new and better ones can be anticipated each year. It is much better to know how to produce different ones and be reasonably prepared to produce them, but not to produce the actual agents or weapons until needed. The information that has come out from Iraq thus far supports this type of approach much more than the ”we know he has them, we just have to learn where they are” approach, although actual WMD may still be well hidden someplace. Moreover, insofar as halting the spread of WMD, the most important aspect is the people who have developed the agents and know how to produce them and handle them. That is, the handful of technical people and their records are most important, along with strains of biological agents, not massive stockpiles of agents and delivery systems. The latter can always be duplicated, but not the people.

Wherever the truth lies, thus far the first goal has not been reached. So far, based on all publicly-available information, all efforts in this respect have failed.

Goal Two: Capture Hussein And His Top Commanders

The situation with respect to capturing (or killing) Hussein and his fifty top commanders is also far less than satisfying. It is also too reminiscent of our goal with respect to bin Laden and the top al-Qaeda and Taliban leadership. In both cases, there evidently was no serious U.S. effort in the war plans to prevent the escape of the enemy leadership that we were certainly led to believe were main targets if not the main target. This was either intended or the simple consequence of not wanting to commit the number of ground and special operations troops that would have been necessary to seal the borders, as indicated above. This omission was so obvious, alternative explanations do not easily come to mind. Perhaps there was really no immediate concern for Hussein and his commanders, except that they get out of the way. But, if this were the case, then why all the focus on the atrocities he had committed against the Iraqi people? Much more important, how could an Iraqi government be put in place and expected to function with Saddam and his top commanders still at large and Baghdad dominated by Suni Muslims?

What is additionally disturbing was the high-profile U.S. bomber opportunity strikes using four 2000 pound precision-guided bombs on a small building in which Hussein, his two sons, and other key leaders were presumably meeting as the U.S. Marines and Army were advancing into Baghdad. This is disturbing for three reasons. First, the idea of Hussein and his sons and top leaders meeting in an exposed facility is simply outside the pattern. Second, there was no time for source evaluation and the CIA is notoriously bad when it comes to understanding deception. For example, the position of the top U.S. deception official in the Reagan Administration was that they (the CIA) had never been deceived by the Soviet Union! Third, given the nature of the structure, why would one even want to use more than one precision-guided 2000 pound bomb – or maybe two, to cover the contingency that the first did not work, or to amplify the effect of the first? But using four such bombs seems blatantly designed to obliterate anything, including any evidence of who, if anyone, was killed in the attack. Was this necessary, or was there a hidden agenda?

We now have in custody 12 of the 55 ”most wanted” Iraqi officials.That’s about a 22 percent success rate – unquestionably nice, buthardly something to brag about. Judging from those apprehended, they could be very useful in helping to resolve the WMD puzzle and to find out where the four-to-ten billion dollars Hussein is estimated to have stashed away are located. Those that possess important knowledge should be able to trade their freedom and financial security for information. It would seem to be a fair trade too, unless the United States does not really want to know or is concerned about turning them loose in return for the data because of the backlash to similar secret arrangements following WWII when protection and pleasant lives were provided to select Italian, German, and Japanese officials in return for their cooperation and silence. If there are no significant new insights respecting the whereabouts of Hussein’s WMD or billions of dollars over the next few weeks or so, there may be further reason for questioning even the slim advances toward this goal so far.

Goal Three: Affect Regime Change

Destroying the dictatorship and implanting a non-threatening democracy was possibly the most important (to those who set the agenda) of all the goals. The problem with the U.S. actions is that now they do not appear to be what was promised: namely, to enable the Iraqis to govern themselves and then go home. Developing a working democracy is hardly a simple or quick-fix task. Years can be required. Nor is there any indication that the Iraqis will be allowed to set up their own government without the U.S. imposing a ”litmus test.”

The U.S. administration has stated over and over that U.S. ground forces would leave as soon as a new government was functioning. The goal was to leave within six months. President Bush has repeatedly stated that the United States is a ”freeing,” not occupying power, andwill leave as soon as a new Iraqi government is in place. The reality, however, was brought out in an interview with TV news anchor Tom Brokaw that was aired on April 27. When Brokaw stated pressing the President for a date when we would leave, President Bush made it clear that there was no deadline for withdrawing U.S. forces and that it might be two years or longer before U.S. troops would leave.

The problem here has been made blatantly evident by the dominant war forces in the Pentagon and in the offices of the President and Vice President. These were mainly civilians. The military did not want war. These war forces are the neocons.[2] The real action plan, as opposed to declaratory plan, is not to let the Iraqis govern themselves but to set up a pro-Israeli government in Baghdad.

The thinking of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld is another example of that within the Administration. In an interview with Associated Press,[3] he said that the United States would not allow a religious government like the one that exists in Iran to come to power in Iraq. However, where the belief in a religious government is imbedded in the society, this may not be realistic thinking, as illustrated by Iran. There were no serious U.S. concerns about the government of Iran before the Shah left. The problem was what happened after Khomeni returned. Short of occupying the country for many years, just how one can guard against such a change?

Another indication of the Administration’s approach is the U.S. official in charge of rebuilding Iraq, Gen. Jay Gardner, who has been described in the press as having close ties to Israel. He has predicted that the governmental process in Iraq will be up and running in a week. Nevertheless, as presaged by President Bush’s remarks above, it is unlikely U.S. troops will be able to depart at that time. Among other problems, there is an emerging hostility to the U.S. presence. This hostility can be seen within the Iraqi population, the religious leadership (Iraq is a Muslim country, like it or not), and within 15 Arab states that have called for ”an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the invading forces from Iraqi territories.”[4] They also made the important point that Iraq should be governed by the Iraqis, which probably means they do not want U.S. or Israeli stooges running a puppet government, which appears to be precisely the direction in which the United States is headed.

In other words, a potentially horrendous religious and ethnic conflict may be in the process of forming. If it continues to gather momentum, it is unlikely to come to an amicable end in the foreseeable future.

This should have been expected. There has been no factual information released that demonstrates that Iraq played a significant role in 9-11 or represented a major threat to the United States. In assessing the information used to justify the attack in the first place, the only reasonable conclusion supported by data is that the driving force behind the war has been the pro-Israel neocons in the administration.[5] The real rationale is not U.S. security but Israeli interests. The actions following the termination of major hostilities have only given increased support to this hypothesis.

This hypothesis was first documented last summer in the Daily Telegraph. If reasonable, and at present it seems to be the most credible alternative, the crisis is far from over. It is hard to imagine the Arabs doing nothing while a pro-Israel government is installed in Iraq without putting up a fight. This could very well make the situation the UN (and U.S. as the UN’s policeman) faced in Somalia in 1993 look like child’s play in comparison. This would seem to suggest a continued U.S. military presence for the foreseeable future.

In Iraq, the United States seems to have taken on the role of Israel’s dupe or ”hit man” – especially in light of the various blatantIsraeli comments that have revealed its attitude, such as how it ownedthe United States. In the process, urged on by the neocons, who pursue power at any cost, the United States may have unwittingly brought the Suni and Shiite Muslems (perhaps most of the Arab world) together – ”the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” which also seems to be what brought Hussein and bin Laden together. The problem is not the military conduct of the war but the manner in which the power was flaunted (for example in the U.S. National Security Strategy document)and the stated U.S. political agenda governing the war, which included the ”Shock and Awe” demonstration, not to subdue Iraq as much as to provide a political example to all Arab countries. It is clear from the various Administration spokesmen and the President himself that the goal of Shock and Awe was to cause the other Arab countries to rethink their ways and, in effect, to knuckle under to Israeli interests. One almost has to expect these roosters to come home to roost as soon as the Arab world decides the time is right or ripe. One thing is for certain – if and when they do, it will be on terms favorable to them. It is unlikely they will do anything to directly challenge U.S. military power.

Danger and Tragedy

President Bush has shown his style: not to change just because the going gets tough, not to brook dissent, and certainly not to think he owes anyone an explanation. At present he is on the neocon railroad. Due to the nature of the linkages, the news media is also on this railroad and, in effect, are giving him all the rope he needs to hang himself. The peace he faces may turn out to be much more of a problem than the war and a potential serious pitfall. Unfortunately, if and when the situation becomes ugly, the news media will find great delight in taking him to the cleaners, just as they did his dad.

The real tragedy in all this is that no one sincerely cares very much about human or ethical values, not to mention the America’s founding principles. Everyone justifies what they do in the name of the people, but no one really cares very much – except to maintain the best possible public relations image. This can be seen 1) in the use of four 2000 bomb precision-guided bombs to show how thorough the U.S. wanted to be in going after Hussein, even after inviting him to abdicate to a sunny island or flee the U.S. Shock and Awe demonstration; 2) in the hardships faced by the Iraqis first in 1991 and today in 2003; 3) in the devastation to the magnificent national Iraqi cultural treasures in their priceless museum and library, which the U.S. failed to protect (as they clearly protected the Mosques) notwithstanding the warnings and pleas received; 4) in the succession of people considered to be temporary Iraq governors, and 5) in the affront to the Iraqi people by first paying Iraqi laborers in U.S. dollars and then appointing pro-Israeli leaders to control the new government the Iraqis are supposed to be building.

We were promised a ”surgical” war that would not disrupt the country. It is not evident that any of the underlying problems that existed before the invasion have been solved. That may happen over the next year. It is equally, perhaps more likely that they will turn out to have been made worse. Only time will tell. At the same time,

• Thousands of innocent Iraqis have been killed, so many that no statistics are available,
• Electricity, water, and health facilities were disrupted for a lengthy period, some hospitals are still not functioning well,
• Thousands of prisoners remain under U.S. control,
• Numerous national buildings have been destroyed or heavily damaged and the cost of restoration will be enormous,
• Hatred toward the United States has increased in the Arab world and throughout Europe and Latin America,
• A large tax burden has been laid on the American people at the worst time in over a hundred years, and
• In all likelihood, security, safety, and freedom have suffered a major blow.

As in the case of the war aims accomplishments, whether this is overly pessimistic or optimistic will not be known for several years.

Footnotes:

1 See for example, Robert Baer, See No Evil, and Reuel Marc Gerecht, ”Can’t Anybody Here Play ThisGame,” in Atlantic online, February 1998 and ”Liberate Iraq” in TheWeekly Standard, May 14, 2001.

2 See Ralph Hallow, ”’Neocons’ get boost in defeat of Saddam,” TheWashington Times, April 27, 2003, http://www .washingtontimes.com/national/20030427-12845138.htm,and Stephen Sniegosky, ”War In Iraq – Conceived In Israel,” CurrentConcerns, 1 2003, http://www.currentconc erns.ch/archive/20030102.php.

3 Associated Press, ”U.S. has Tariq Aziz in custody,” NorthernVirginia Daily, April 25, 2003.

4 Ibid.

5 See Ralph Hallow, ”’Neocons’ get boost in defeat of Saddam,” TheWashington Times, April 27, 2003, http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20030427-12845138.htm,a nd Stephen Sniegosky, ”War In Iraq – Conceived In Israel,” CurrentConcerns, 1 2003, http://www.currentconc erns.ch/archive/20030102.php.