War Watch #10

By Joseph D. Douglass Jr

Over the past two weeks, I have had the privilege to take part in several discussions. The subject of each discussion was U.S. policy, with a focus on the war on terrorism and Iraq. The participants were dominantly “independent thinkers,” although one or two administration officials informally participated.

The “sense” of the situation was particularly interesting. This sense is summarized here.

A basic question raised at different times focused on the terrorist attacks on U.S. and other “nation building” forces in Iraq. “Will the terrorist attacks increase or decrease following the turn-over of government controls on June 30?”

Each time this question was raised, the answer was the same: The terrorist attacks will almost certainly increase. No one saw any reasonable justification for expecting the attacks to decrease. These attacks are directed against U.S. presence and policy. The turn-over is more symbolic than real and will not cause the attacks to decrease. Moreover, each increase will place the re-election of President Bush at increased jeopardy.

A follow-on question was also discussed: “Will an increase in U.S. forces contribute to stability and security? The sense of the discussion here was also discouraging. None of those present believed that increased security would come from increased security forces. This is quite important. In looking for a difference between the two candidates, Bush and Kerry, none of significance could be identified. Both candidates were wedded to the need for U.S. forces to remain and both, in effect, were promoting increased deployments to Iraq. These could be as few as 50,000 or as many as 150,000. No one believed that either increase would be significant because of the depth and breadth of the animosity present.

It was equally clear that no one expected any meaningful help to come from the UN. That is, other nations around the world see Iraq as a no-win situation and nearly every country around the world has been antagonized by U.S. policy and are more interested in seeing the United States fail than come to our assistance.

Notwithstanding this bleak assessment of the situation, none of those present could see the United States withdraw and leave the problem to the Iraqis. This was believed to be the situation today and even should the situation become even worse as all expect will happen. The sense was that the Bush administration would not pull out, even if the President’s popularity rating continued to decrease. Nor did any expect candidate Kerry, should he win, to pull out.

Several times I posed the question: “How bad does it have to get before we decide that there was no way to justify our continued involvement?” The response to this question surprised me. The initial response was silence. Then, one or another would say, in effect, that we could not simply walk away. To this I said that this was exactly what happened in 1973 in Vietnam – except that we did not walk, we ran. At this juncture, the discussion would invariably shift to a different subject.

In other words, while President Bush will feel the brunt of the negatives associated with increased terrorist activity, the sense of the discussions was that there is almost no limit to what might be done to salvage the election, but pulling out is not one option. Moreover, equally strong was the sense that independent of who wins, the strength of U.S. deployments will be increased and that this more likely than not will require some reinstatement of the draft. Also equally firm was the belief that increased security forces will not win out. The country will more likely than not be coalesced against the occupying forces and puppet governments and ultimately degenerate into a civil war.

Even is spite of this negative prognosis, only two participants argued that the best course of action was to withdraw. A greater than minority opinion was that a broadening of the war to include hostilities in Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, as many feared would follow the attack on Iraq, was more likely than a withdraw.

One can only wonder if it was not a strong negative intelligence assessment of the situation in the Middle East, much to the consternation of those who conceived the war strategy in the first place, that led to the most sudden departure of CIA director George Tenet. A messenger bearing bad news is unlikely to survive an atmosphere dominated by those whose agenda does not include information that is not consistent with policy desires.

* * *

As the weeks go by, the war in Iraq takes on more and more of the characteristics of the Vietnam War. The ones that most immediately come to my mind are:

– no meaningful strategy,

– no acceptance on the “threat” and its ability to “stay the course,”

– blind adherence to unrealistic goals,

– manipulation of intelligence to support policy dictates,

– an elitist leadership attitude which is not interested in criticism, and

– military leaders who would rather go along than resign and protest.

Of these, and people who have studied Vietnam can extend the list, the most fatal characteristics are the absence of strategy, self-deception respecting the nature of the threat, and an arrogant attitude that says, “Quit fighting us, we know best.”