Will Iran Plunge the World into a Nuclear Inferno?

by Dr. Sebastian Pflugbeil, Physicist, Germany

Once again, the moralists, politicians, and journalists are racking their brains for ways to persuade Iran not to develop, build, and ultimately use atomic weapons. The consensus, of course, is that the Iranian bomb must be prevented no matter what; the discussion is simply about how – negotiation, action, incentives, sanctions, blackmail, bombing? To be on the safe side, none of these possibilities has been categorically excluded, but so far the discussion has been polite and diplomatic. However, even this seemingly straightforward debate contains many cunning twists and turns.

Have we already forgotten the carefully fomented hysteria about Saddam’s alleged atomic bomb and the fatal consequences of those lies? Among other things, the consequences included a war of aggression by the US against Iraq; the violation of international law by the US; the murder of literally innumerable men, women, and children; Guantanamo; and torture – not to mention the safeguarding of the US’s basic security interests – or rather, oil interests. Really, it wasn’t that long ago. It is frustrating that although the Iraq war has been broadly and uniformly condemned, the mental preparations for a war against Iran are simultaneously in full swing, with the help of polite diplomacy.

In her 1983 novel Cassandra, the celebrated East German writer Christa Wolf penetrated to the heart of the problem: “But where were we living? I always have to give myself a sharp reminder: Did anyone in Troy speak of war? No. They would have been punished. So we prepared for war innocently and with clear consciences. The first sign of war: we became like the enemy. What did we even need an enemy for?” And: “It is possible to know when a war begins, but when does the pre-war begin? If there are rules about this, we need to pass them on. Engrave them in clay, in stone, make sure they are transmitted to the next generation. And what would the rules say? Among other things, they would say: ‘Don’t be fooled by your own people’.”

Almost all the information about Iran’s atomic program comes from US and Israeli secret intelligence sources. Of course, we still remember how easily this kind of information – which by definition cannot be double-checked – can be made to conform flexibly to the agendas of completely different interests operating quietly in the background. Information about the Iraqi atomic program, which was the most important reason given by the US for the war in Iraq, came from precisely the same sources. As a result, therefore, a certain hesitation in regard to the information about Iran seems appropriate, even if it seems reasonable to assume that no one is interested in being caught again in the kind of lie that proved so embarrassing in the case of Iraq.

What we do know (even provisionally) is nevertheless impressive. Gerhard Piper of the Berlin Institute for Transatlantic Studies (BITS) has summarized as follows: Iran has significant uranium deposits of its own near Saghand. In Ardekan, yellow cake (a uranium oxide concentrate chemically extracted from powdered uranium ore) is being produced. A second such facility is being built near Bandar Abbas. Uranium hexafloride, a gaseous uranium compound that is used as an ingredient in centrifugal uranium enrichment, is being produced in the atomic research center near Shiraz, and at the University of Isfahan as well. In the Natanz area, an initial testing facility for enriching uranium has already been built, and an industrial plant (three giant buildings with 50,000 centrifuges) has already been planned, although negotiations are still going on about whether it will be permitted to begin operations. The facility was built 25 meters under the earth in a heavily-armored bunker. There is also another uranium enrichment facility being built near Ardekan. In addition to all these there are several smaller facilities, including an experimental facility for laser enrichment. In Busher (near Teheran), a 1000-megawatt Russian reactor is almost online – it is waiting only for Russian fuel elements. In Isfahan, 3000 experts are working on the atomic bomb. There are rumors, but only rumors, about facilities in Neka, Tabas, and Berg Chalus. We also know that this list is incomplete.

It is hardly a secret that several western and eastern countries provided strong and tangible support – legal, half-legal, and criminal – for the Iranian atomic program. In general, the picture of Iran’s nuclear capability is taking on far more dangerous contours than the picture that was painted of Iraq’s nuclear capacity, which was used as the pretext for the US war of aggression. Nevertheless, there still doesn’t seem actually to be an Iranian atomic bomb – we are dealing simply with fairly plausible intent.

In order to prevent any misunderstanding, then, let me state unequivocally that we absolutely must work to ensure that Iran does not build any atomic weapons. The problem is not the subject of the debate, but the hypocrisy displayed by its participants. If we look at a map, we can see where the roughly 25 known Iranian atomic facilities are located. To the west and east are Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively – two countries that have been brutally bombed by the Americans. Somewhat farther to the west is Israel, and farther east are India and Pakistan – all three of which have for years had both atomic research centers and actual atomic weapons, and none of which has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. To Iran’s north is the atomic power Russia, and to the south are the US Marines with their atomic weapons – and this doesn’t even count the ever-increasing number of US bases in the surrounding general area. The biggest atomic arsenal in the region, though, is in Israel, and Israel is staying silent. To his very great credit, the nuclear technician Mordechai Vanunu provided credible evidence that brought the Israeli program to light – but the price he paid was 18 years in prison, 12 of which were spent in solitary confinement. Looking at all this, I believe that it is simply unacceptable to try to have a public debate about how to prevent Iran from obtaining its own atomic weapon and to refuse to rule out any options, even war, without also making Israel, Pakistan, and India into nuclear-free zones. It is likewise unacceptable – and not only from Iran’s perspective – that these discussions have been initiated by the US, France, and England, since all of these countries have disregarded their own obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty to reduce their nuclear stockpiles.

An equally fundamental question that we need to ask is whether it is really possible to promote so-called peaceful atomic energy without making it possible for this capability to be misused for military purposes. It would also be well worth finding out how many of the nuclear technicians, physicists, and chemists who are involved in uranium enrichment, or in related industries or sensitive research in the new atomic or threshold states, were educated in Germany. One example is the well-known Dr. Khan, who studied metallurgy in Germany, worked at the uranium enrichment firm Urenco, and then disappeared to Pakistan, together with construction plans and know-how. Today Dr. Khan is spearheading the Pakistani atomic bomb effort.

We cannot, then, seriously promote the construction of atomic reactors in the third world while trying to forbid these countries from striving toward the goal of independently securing and enriching uranium. Likewise, it is foolish to believe that no one in these countries wants to have what we ourselves are not willing to give up – our atomic weapons.

Of course, wherever there are research reactors and atomic power plants, plutonium will necessarily become part of the equation – and plutonium is a material that is even better suited for bombs than uranium. Israel, Pakistan, India, and Iran offer exemplary proof of the contention that one cannot have peaceful atomic power without also having military atomic might. Indeed, that is an understatement. In these states, as well as in the classic atomic powers England, France, Russia, China, and the US, the decision to use atomic energy was from the very beginning driven by military considerations.

One of the oldest and most convincing arguments against the use of atomic energy is that atomic reactors cannot effectively be protected against military or terrorist attacks. One might believe that we are fortunate that no one has yet tried to bomb an atomic facility – but unfortunately, the reality is that in the Far and Middle East there has been more than one attack on neighboring atomic reactors.

On September 30, 1980, at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war, two Iranian phantom fighters launched a missile attack against the Baghdad research center Tuwaitha, but did not hit the two research reactors Osiraq and Isis. On June 7, 1981 the research center was attacked again. Eight Israeli F-16 bombers, accompanied by eight F-15 jets, dropped sixteen MK-85 1000-kilogram bombs on the reactors. Fifteen hit their targets and severely damaged the two reactors Isis and Osiraq. It was in this context that the so-called “Begin Doctrine” was formulated in Israel: “We will never allow any of our enemies to develop weapons of mass destruction that can be used against our people.”

It is worth reflecting on what might have happened if Saddam Hussein had attacked the Israeli atomic center Daimona with sixteen 1000-kilogram bombs. During the first Gulf War, Iraqi planes (manufactured in France and the Soviet Union) attacked the Iranian reactor then under construction in Busher seven times between March 1984 and November 1987. Today, the Israelis are trying to persuade the US to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities. Because Iran’s atomic infrastructure has been designed to be diffuse and multi-layered, such an undertaking would not be easy. To be on the safe side, the US has delivered 102 long-range F-16I bombers to the Israelis and is considering throwing in 5000 smart bombs, including 500 "Bunker Busters". These BLU-109s can be dropped from the F-16Is, weigh up to 1 ton, and can penetrate up to 10 meters into the ground or cement. That would hardly touch the bunkered Iraqi facilities. One can only imagine how loud the screams and enormous the catastrophe would be if the bombardment of atomic facilities were extended to Europe or the US.

How convincing are the current German efforts to oppose the atomic bomb that is likely being developed in Iran? They might be convincing if the German Federal Republic were to start by taking a clear and unmistakable stance against atomic weapons within its own borders. This, however, is not the case. Germany signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty only very reluctantly, and at the time of the signing stipulated several limitations that would apply to Germany alone – very strange behavior that, however, clearly was tolerated by the other signers. Germany accepts having American atomic weapons stationed on its soil, weapons that are maintained and, if necessary, flown to their destinations by German soldiers. “Outsourcing” is the word used to describe the US’s method of dealing with its atomic weapons.

Germany cooperates with France and the US to develop atomic weapons; for example, it delivers high-powered lasers to French and American atomic weapons laboratories. In its laws regulating military weapons, Germany for decades forbade any kind of NBC weapons. In 1990 the slippery Paragraph 16 was inserted, which opened the floodgates and permitted Germany to work either alone or in cooperation with its NATO partners on atomic weapons. The public has not even noticed this subtle change, let alone investigated or criticized it. Germany has also just approved the drastic expansion of the uranium-enrichment capacity in Gronau (Urenco) – what is that supposed to mean in a time when nuclear power is being phased out? Just a few months ago, Germany started operations at its research reactor in Garching (near Munich), which uses highly-enriched, weapons-quality uranium as its primary fuel. For this there is not only no plausible scientific argument – it is actually a regression back to 20 years ago when, with a great deal of effort and pressure, the US succeeded in converting nearly all the research reactors around the world to non-weapons-quality uranium because of the danger of military misuse. German firms and German merchants continually appear on the lists of exporters of devices, material, and knowledge related to weapons of mass destruction. Leading German politicians are busy trying to shape Germany into a European military power that can represent European interests at home and abroad – and they want it to be an atomic power.

• Can we agree to demand, at every opportunity, that Israel, India, and Pakistan give up their atomic weapons and sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty?
• Can we agree that we in Germany neither need nor desire atomic weapons?
• Can we agree that we neither need nor desire a European atomic power?
• Can we agree that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has its weaknesses, but that it must be upheld at least as it is – especially by countries with atomic weapons?

Then – and only then – can we also agree to reject the Iranian atomic bomb.