Making resound the “European orchestra”

European integration (part 5) | Political union or changing back obviously misguided developments

by Dr rer. phil. Werner Wüthrich, Switzerland

On 28 and 29 June the EU Crisis Summit took place in Brussels. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has announced a working plan for a political union. It will be about “more Europe”. “We do not only need a monetary union, we need a so-called fiscal union, that is more common fiscal policy,” she said on the German channel ARD. But above all, a political union was necessary. It includes the shift of competencies to Brussels.

This is nothing new. Certain political circles wanting to increasingly merge the European nation-states ever more into a political union have long since made use of the euro crisis for their own purposes. The crisis would force the member states into a political union, they say. Additional competencies in the fiscal and financial sectors should urgently be handed over to Brussels. Euro-bonds with their comprehensive liability were among them. Fifty years ago, Jean Monnet said the following: “Man will accept changes only under the pressure of necessity.” Economic crises would serve as a lever to enforce more integration steps (see Current Concerns 31/12/2011). These circles are now on the rise. However – is a crisis really a sound basis for the establishment of a political union?

Sensible observers and politicians, however, reflect on what works and what does not work in Europe – and courageously start changing back obviously misguided developments. – Quo vadis, Europe?

In the series of articles, “Making resound the ‘European orchestra’” (see 31 December 2011, 5 February 2012, 11 February 2012, 18 February 2012) Current Concerns highlighted fundamental issues of living together in Europe in its historical development. In the following article the main ideas are to be put together into an overall picture. It is useful to know history before taking ground-breaking decisions.

Jean Monnet

Central to the current development is the person of Jean Monnet, whose work can be regarded as a key to understanding the euro crisis today. According to his ideas the nations of Europe should – step by step – be merged into an increasingly “closer union”, i.e. a kind of federal state. This approach followed – as documents that are accessible today in Switzerland show – the strategic planning of the United States after World War II.

Jean Monnet had lived in the US for more than twenty years and maintained close relationships to the economic and political elite in this country. He held important functions in the financial industry. He was vice president of a major bank and founded his own bank. During World War II he was working in a high position in the American war industry. He was a close friend of the later Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

Politicians in Switzerland around the Federal Councilor Schaffner (and with them a number of politicians in other European countries), however, aimed at a liberal cooperation in order to make resound the “European Orchestra” after the horrors of the Second World War. They conceived of the European integration as a more equal and friendly cooperation between sovereign nations. This political line of thought shaped the OEEC and led to the establishment of the EFTA in 1960.

The United States as the leading world power steered the proceedings from the background. They favored the idea of the EEC and opposed the idea of a free trade zone in which the European nations would cooperate as sovereign states. They actively tried to prevent the EFTA, because it did not fit into their political world concept, and after it had been founded in 1960 they worked towards its dissolution. According to the ideas of the United States, Europe should overcome “particularism” and form a unified political bloc in the interplay of forces in world politics. Jean Monnet tirelessly promoted this idea until his death in 1978 – mainly through his transnational networks, which he had been indefatigably building up. Switzerland was also involved from the outset. In 1957, Jean Monnet established the office for his “Action Committee for the United States of Europe” in Lausanne. A little later a documentation center was added, where today the founding documents of the ECSC and the EEC are kept. The Ford Foundation from the United States funded the Center for European Studies. In 1978, Monnet founded the “Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe” there. The Ferme de Dorigny is now a meeting place for those who are cultivating Jean Monnet’s ideas.

Charles de Gaulle

Another person played a ground-breaking role in this struggle for Europe’s future – the French president Charles de Gaulle. With respect to European integration he pursued the vision of a “Europe of nations” and thus championed a similar line as EFTA.

With Jean Monnet and Charles de Gaulle two very different personalities were active in Paris whose views about how the coexistence of the peoples of Europe should be organized were in contradiction with each other. These two visions have been and still are opposing each other. The media of the time referred to the confrontation of the two opponents as the “duel of the century” (see Current Concerns of 2 April).

Success of economic integration

In historical retrospect, the European Community today does not seem to be without certain glamour – even from the perspective of an EU-skeptic. Many obstacles at the country’s borders have been abolished step by step. The exchange of merchandise and services was made easier. Technical differences and barriers were lifted, so that life in Europe has become easier. The economic solidarity has been successful in many ways and is now widely accepted.

1989 – Setting the fatal course

In 1989 the authorities in Brussels took decisions in Monnet’s spirit that had serious consequences and ultimately led to the mess that we experience today. The newly elected Commission president Jacques Delors presented a three-stage plan to establish the economic and monetary union, whose first milestone was reached in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The “ever closer union among the peoples of Europe” (as it is stated in the Treaties of Rome) was then given an increasingly political manifestation. It was not just about a common currency. A common security and foreign policy and adjustments in the fields of justice and home affairs were added. It soon became apparent that this policy was moving on thin ice.

Denmark and Great Britain did not join the monetary union. Countries that did not fit the monetary union were included. Other countries that met the conditions, however, did not join. The voters in Switzerland, who in 1972 had approved of the major free trade zone between the countries of the EC and EFTA by 71 percent, now opposed a membership in the EEA. In contrast to the free trade agreement that was settled between sovereign countries, the EEA provided for the automatic adoption of EU law and thus a political integration.

Endless corrections

After “Maastricht” the leaders steadily continued their way towards a political union. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) shaped the common foreign and security policy. Freedom of movement as one of the Union’s civil rights was connected with migration policy, asylum policy and immigration policy and was implemented. The Treaty of Nice (2003) brought about a large number of “repair measures” to the prior agreements and broke with the principle of unanimity. The vote of a qualified majority became possible. This time, the Irish did obstruct and had to be instructed. In 2005, voters in France and the Netherlands clearly rejected the “Draft Constitution for Europe” so that referendums were not held in other countries for good reason, and the “exercise” was eventually entirely broken off. This was a clear signal. The outcome of that fiasco was the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) which simply took over the key provisions of the rejected “Draft Constitution” into the existing treaties. Again, the Irish said No. The EU put the Irish under moral pressure again and made some concessions so that they finally agreed. Even today there is still no agreement as to the planned fiscal and transfer union. Some states want to achieve them outside the agreements. Now, by the end of June there is a crisis summit in Brussels: As Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel told the media a working plan to establish a political union is on the agenda for the negotiations. However – the patchwork of treaties and the continuing corrections and “repairs”, which no one can overlook, are not likely to really build up confidence.

What kind of “Europe” do the citizens really want?

Do the nations of Europe want a political union, or do they not want it? There is no possibility to pass by this crucial question, today. Fickle politics, the events of recent years, the mood, the number of discord and arguments give the answer: There is no such thing as a people with a feeling for a European homeland who would support this union and stand up for it. Without a people there is no democracy, as this term is derived from the Greek word “demos” (= people). The European countries are not ready and willing to make the big step into a common state – as it was on Jean Monnet’s mind when he began to promote the “United States of Europe” in the 1950s. The reasons are manifold and complex. This is not just about economic issues such as balanced budgets or competitiveness, but also about the political cultures and the individual histories, the lifestyles and habits of the population and much more. The differences are large and distinguish one country from the other. They enrich life in Europe and make it impossible to uniform the many nations politically or to squeeze them into a single corset. The history of Europe is the proof. On the occasion of an ambassadors’ meeting in the 1960s Federal Councilor Hans Schaff­ner aptly put it as follows: You would have to outwit the individual peoples and push them into this step and he had very great doubts whether this would succeed (dodis.ch/30358).

At the crossroads: dismantling or “muddling along” like before?

The obvious thing to do would be a sober pause and a farewell to the obsession that political integration would necessarily continue forever. True reformers are required who critically examine what really works in the EU and what does not, and who have the courage to demount if necessary. It is not just about the euro and about debts. I really doubt whether the centralization of agricultural policy in Brussels was a good idea. More than any other industry, agriculture is directly connected with the country and the people can be of existential significance in case of crises. I also think of the subsidy policy of the EU in the context of the various funds. Hundreds of billions – all with good intentions – have flown into the southern countries in the course of decades in order to strengthen the “entrepreneurial spirit”, as the story goes in the Brussels papers. Today’s unemployment figures show that this money has not nearly achieved what we had hoped for.

What answers does the European EFTA model provide?

The EFTA is an agreement that preserves the sovereignty of the nations involved. On 4 January 1960 Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland and Portugal signed the Stockholm Convention, which formed the basis of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Article 3 contained the obligation to abolish customs duties and quantitative restrictions on imports within the next ten years. The Convention allowed exceptions in the event that a country was in financial trouble. Basically, the Convention was limited to the trade with industrial goods. Article 21 explicitly pointed to the special nature of agriculture. Their products have been excluded from tariff reductions. The aim of the EFTA countries was to overcome the divisions in Europe and to establish a pan-European free trade zone.
In 1972 the negotiators of the EFTA and the European Community (EC) succeeded in negotiating a real breakthrough. They achieved the establishment of a free trade zone for all countries of the EC and EFTA, which was initially intended for industrial goods but was later enlarged more and more to be valid in the service sector. Agriculture remained the individual countries’ affair.

The Free Trade Agreement of 1972 convinced the voters in Switzerland to a great extent. 71 percent of the people and all the cantons welcomed this way of preserving the sovereignty of the countries involved. In subsequent years Switzerland – mostly alone or as a member of EFTA – settled numerous other bilateral agreements with the EC which also included the service sector. Depending on the way of counting 130-180 bilateral agreements were signed, which contained significantly more participation rights compared with current agreements. It was a peaceful and respectful coexistence of different systems. The countries of the EC and EFTA had reduced the barriers at the borders and mainly achieved their objective of economic integration in Europe.

In 2001, the EFTA Convention was completely revised. New additions included the free movement of persons, and rules for trade in services, capital trade and the protection of intellectual property.

Since the 1990s, free trade agreements have gained increasing significance in the global economy. Since the failed Doha Round of WTO, this trend has been strengthened. For some years now, EFTA States have begun to expand their free trade policy on partners outside Europe. Today the EFTA disposes of a network with a variety of customized free trade agreements around the world. An agreement with China has recently been completed, one is about to be settled with India.

Paradigm shift

Since the Second World War, the US has included a uniform “Europe” in its world political concept, and has actively worked towards its establishment. It was the time of the Cold War. The various countries should overcome their “particularism” and form a single block, an ever closer union. Jean Monnet spread this message – as already mentioned – until his death via his cross-national network and continuously promoted this project.

However – the Cold War, which was behind this policy, has long been over. Does this outdated approach still meet the needs of European nations? Is it suitable for the future? In the modern world of today relations between states can be regulated much better if they are based on a free, independent way by agreements. Every country wants to be taken seriously as a mature and sovereign party to an agreement. – The idea of the ever closer supra-national union which unites “Europe” in one block is a relic of the Cold War of the last century and mainly originates from the United States. How long is this heteronomy still to continue?

It is true that the EFTA has no foundation of power and no political agenda. Therefore it is more versatile than the lumbering colossus EU. Thus the EFTA has succeeded in recent years – often even before the EU has – to settle customized free trade agreements with a variety of countries around the globe. Such agreements are hardly possible in large formations like the EU because the interests of a variety of countries must be inevitably measured by the same yardstick.

The two models of how Europe could be organized have an impact on the internal organization of individual member states: In a political union, the structures of member countries have to adjust so that they can be centrally controlled. This process is already underway. “Overcoming small-scale areas”, “mergers of all kinds”, “cross-border regionalization” and “establishment of metropolitan regions” are the steps which lead to large areas that are managed centrally and – nota bene – not by elected bodies, but by representatives appointed by big business.

Vibrant democracy

The fact is that especially in the small-scale structures democracy can develop best, because it is directly shaped and supported by the people. Tailor-made agreements can show greatest consideration for those characteristics.
The EU members have already handed over a large part of their sovereignty to the headquarters. Accordingly, their autonomy has been reduced in some countries. In the euro and debt crisis, this attitude has proved to be fatal. This lack of autonomy may not be compensated with an additional level of supervision and tutelage. Such an approach prevents coexistence in freedom and dignity, something that the Greek culture prepared the ground for in Europe more than 2000 years ago.

It is much to be hoped that such considerations are included in the considerations at the crisis summit in Brussels and that the voters will have the final say when it come to landmark decisions.     •