Russia’s Role in the New World Order

by Prof. Wolfgang Seiffert*

I. A new world order is in the making

1. The present world order is undergoing a complex and contradictory process of development, caused on the one hand by dramatic political and geopolitical changes due to the downfall of the so-called systems of “real Socialism” in Eastern Europe after Germany’s reunification. On the other hand the increasing role that Asian states are playing, in particular China and India, as well as US efforts to secure its global predominance are also impacting this development. Moreover, there also exists an order of International Law embodied by the United Nations, which is dominated by the Security Council’s five permanent members and nuclear powers (USA, Great Britain, France, Russia and China) with their right of veto. This order of International Law remains valid to date, despite various attempts on the part of the US to alter it to its own advantage through illegal interpretations or by force in carrying out military operations that contradict International Law. Recent developments even show that the diminishing political, military and politico-economic power of the USA is forcing it to submit itself to UN rules from time to time in order to achieve a consensus among the other Security Council members on certain issues (Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and Lebanon). This is where Russia’s role in the world order becomes particularly evident.
2. Although this development should not be overrated, as it does not truly reflect the US’ general position, it should not be ignored, either. In his book “Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance”1 Chomsky, while emphasizing the US quest for dominance, concludes that this development may still be stopped. In addition, history has shown that there has always been a time where a great power has had a sustained influence on the international order, or has undertaken efforts to create a unipolar world order. Yet these efforts have at no time been truly successful2, and they will not succeed today. See also Putin’s speech held at the 2007 Munich Security Conference3.
3. The usual objections against a stronger UN role in global affairs – that it is too weak and is of diminishing influence – ignore the fact that the UN is the only worldwide organization legitimized to guarantee peace and security and to vote on taking appropriate measures to meet threats of war or the breakdown of peaceful relationships. These measures include the deployment of forces, to which the member states have been bound to contribute with members of their own forces, once the Security Council has established this as necessary4.
As a consequence, the role of the UN deserves to be reinforced as a priority over all other international organizations, including NATO. If all UN member states were to observe their obligations as laid down in the UN Charter a multipolar world would exist that all could accept.
This should be the goal upon which all political efforts should be concentrated, since this goal seems to be a realistic one. It is within this context that Russia’s role in today’s world order will be analyzed in the following.

II. Russia as a present factor of power

1. Russia is still undergoing a process of transformation from a Communist party system to a state of law, to democracy and a market economy. Much has been achieved, although Russia has also experienced certain setbacks. Despite all warranted as well as unwarranted critique of its internal development or foreign-political positions, it has (once again) become a major power factor, it is a nuclear power, a permanent member of the Security Council with power of veto, and besides the US it is the only other state to maintain a continuous presence in space. It exports oil, diamonds and other natural and mineral resources. It has a developing economy and agricultural industry.
The major national problems it faces today are certainly poverty, corruption, crime and a rapidly diminishing Russian population. Yet due to its great amount of currency reserves (amounting to 182 billion dollars), and budget surplus of 83.2 billion dollars (amounting to 7.7% of its GNP), as well as to its almost complete repayment of foreign debts, Russia is not to be expected to experience an economic crisis, even if oil prices were to drop (which is not to be expected either.) In the year 2005, its real GNP growth rate amounted to 6.4%, its real wage increase averaged 12.6%, and its investments added up to 10.5%5.
According to the Russian Central Bank, more foreign currency flowed into Russia in 2006 than Russian currency left the country. The Russian Central Bank’s net capital movement registered a net accrual of 14.5 billion US dollars in 20066.
On July 1, 2006 Russia established the ruble’s complete convertibility; the official currency rate is set at 26 rubles for 1 US dollar, 34 rubles for 1 euro, which is valid for all banks and exchange offices throughout Europe. Although socio-political difficulties cannot be avoided, Russia’s economic stability will continue to increase and make social improvements possible.
2. Russia’s constitution, established in 1993, affirms human rights, a state of law, private property and democracy7. It mandates a constitutional law system based on the German model8.
Russia is member of the European Council and allocates one of its judges to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, to which every citizen of the Russian Federation may appeal. In elections and votes the majority of Russians have affirmed their constitution and governing political system. This affirmation does not necessarily mean direct identification, but the predominant trend to look to the West and to take advantage of the freedom to travel to the West, which was evident immediately after the political transition in 1990/1991, has diminished considerably. Sonja Margolina – a Russian journalist living in Berlin – analyzed the developments and concluded as follows:
“Russians have never been as optimistic about their future as they are now. A majority of the population has been able to improve their living standards. Ivan Consumer is not too concerned about democracy and human rights and agrees with the Kremlin’s self-confident policies. The West must drop the illusion that it can foist its values on the country. Transformation must come from within.”
In her analysis she makes reference to the committed human rights activist Igor Averkin, who declared the following at a conference in Berlin: “When I come to Germany I feel as if I have arrived from a fascist state as a victim. Russia, however, is not a fascist state, and I am not a victim. I am doing well, and I do what I feel is right. In fact: stop giving us money. We will do fine on our own.”9
Russia’s view towards itself – “Russia for Russians” – is manifested in various ways and is increasing and pushing Russia to play an appropriate role in today’s world order. This trend – which should not be discredited as “nationalist” but considered to be a new form of self-confidence – was recently put to words by the author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in a brochure published on the 90th anniversary of the 1917 Revolution, 500,000 copies of which were distributed throughout the country. Solzhenitsyn thereby supported Putin’s policies by describing him as a new Russian absolute ruler who must avoid the mistakes made by the last Czar, Nicholas II10.
3. The faction of Russia’s political elite in support of Putin is currently facing the question of how Russia should shape its future while taking into consideration the entirety of all factors mentioned above. In the short term they expect that, with view towards the Duma elections in December of this year and the presidential elections on 2 March 2008, the substantial revenues from the export of its natural and mineral resources and from its weapons industry will be applied towards raising the living standards of its population (even if not enough), in a smaller and insufficient degree towards promoting its own industry, and – as a visible sign – towards tying the former Soviet Republics closer to Russia.
Yet in the middle to long term this will not be enough and eminent Russian economists have outlined three options open to Russia while emphasizing that the choice between these options will not be made until the new president is elected in 2008. According to the renowned economist Vladimir Gutnik11, Russia must either choose to align itself completely with the EU or Asia (China), or choose a uniquely Russian solution that would adopt much of what has proved of value in Western Europe yet remain independent of it. Some hope that this will enable Russia to escape the constraints of globalization, which others however doubt. Still, Russia’s successful integration as an independent factor within the international currency system, caused by the ruble’s convertibility, is seen by many as the first step in the direction of following a uniquely Russian path.
4. All of the factors mentioned above have led this author to conclude that the political system established under Putin is a stable and permanent one, a system that will also continue under a newly elected president in 2008.
Local elections held in March in 14 regions of Russia12 were generally viewed as “test elections” for the Duma elections in December also revealed that the parties loyal to Putin were victorious13, thus confirming this prognosis.
The call made by Boris Abramovich Berezovsky, the Russian oligarch and Putin enemy living in London exile, in an interview with the British paper “The Guardian” on the 12th of April to violently bring down the current system in Russia, because – according to his view – it cannot be changed democratically –confirms in a way the above mentioned prognosis, as well14.
5. Of course voting results such as these may cause criticism, and criticism was voiced especially with respect to the fact that certain “opposition parties” were excluded from the elections15.
However, the problem mainly concerned parties that either could not meet the ballot conditions as laid down in electoral law or did not reach the percentage clause of 7% that would have allowed them to be included in government16.
Not only were individual election instances criticized but also the political system in general.
Lilia Shevzova from the Carnegie Foundation in Moscow, for instance, describes the current Russian political system as “bureaucratic capitalism” having nothing to do with liberalism and democracy17.
Mommsen comes to a similar conclusion by stating that Russia has become a “Putin system” in which all the important government positions are filled by former members of the military or secret services, as well as by other “Petersburg cronies”, and which is moving from a “controlled democracy” towards an “authoritarian regime.”18 Erler, in his essay “Russland kommt”19, is more pro-Russian. Yet he comes to the conclusion that Putin’s Russia is evolving from “controlled to autocratic democracy. ”
These and other analyses do make such and other correct observations20, although measures taken by Putin to date have all been carried out within the limits of the Russian constitution. It is in fact a particular characteristic of Putin to not only endeavour to remain within the framework of the constitution but also to deliberately use the state of law as an instrument for reaching his political goals21.
Furthermore, these analyses tend to contain principle flaws that in effect distort one’s view of Russian reality.
The major flaw inherent in these analyses is that the authors measure Russia’s development – either directly or indirectly – by the standards of Western values and ideas of democracy. They are continuously fixated upon Russia establishing a so-called “Civil Society” without in any way defining how that term is to be understood22. Yet it has always been clear that Russia under Putin would pursue its “Russian idea”23 and all efforts to align Russia to Western models would only fail and have failed, because you cannot take a country and nation the size of Russia with its history, language and culture and make it deny its own identity. It is an irony of history that it has been precisely Russia’s policy of the last few years which has contributed towards making the country rely on its own interests, potentials and unique path more than ever before24.

III. Consequences of foreign policy

1. Putin’s efforts to establish a “strong state” and his commitment to the “Russian idea” as a consequence have also defined the country’s foreign policy. Immediately after taking office as Russia’s president the characteristics of his foreign policy were evident and were particularly outlined in his address on New Year’s eve of the year 200025.
At that time I noted that in the future Putin would draw upon the “Eurasian concept” as part of the Russian idea, make it a top priority to develop relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States, yet view the US as its most important partner while maintaining good relations with the EU26. His foreign-political orientation certainly seemed to exhibit some contradictions, and the practical application of his foreign policies was in the beginning afflicted by insecurities and fumbling attempts. Nonetheless, it still remains incomprehensible how some observers were able to conclude from this that Russia was seeking “Western integration” and “Europeanization”27.
2. Such analyses neglected the fact that the USA was pursuing – and still is – a geopolitical strategy with Russia that aims at helping such politicians into power in the former Soviet Republics around Russia – and if possible inside Russia as well – who feel primarily allied to the USA and will manoeuvre their country first into the EU and next into the NATO.
a)    That this is part of the USA’s official policy was demonstrated by the performance of Vice President Cheney at an international conference in May 2006 in Vilnius, where he not only criticised the energy policy of the Kremlin but also the allegedly diminishing democratic quality of Russia and where he called for Minsk or Moscow to adapt the western values just as Georgia or Kiew had done28. In his film and book Russ­land im Zangengriff (The Encirclement of Russia)29 this situation was elucidated by Peter Scholl-Latour. But there are some hints that after initial successes the pendulum is swinging back:
b)    In Georgia vehement protests are being voiced against the US-friendly president; American troops that had planned to conduct manoeuvres on the Krim were chased away and in Kiew the rival of Janukowitch, the new west oriented president, became the new Prime Minister. In Russia the forces tending towards the USA are weak and without any significant influence.30
c)    Under these conditions Putin steered his foreign political course, marked by the effort to avoid conflicts by consenting to compromises. In this respect he followed his foreign policy adviser Karagunow, who was convinced that Russia would require another 20 to 30 years in order to come level with the USA.
d)    During this period Putin was capable of nursing good relations with the USA under the motto “fight of terrorism” and at the same time to assume the role of the go between in the nuclear conflict with Iran. This mediator role strengthened Russia’s global political position. Also with other countries in the Asian region Russia succeeded to deepen its relations in particular with China. Although geopolitical and historical interests are not conforming Russia and China take a great effort not to give room to antagonism and demonstrate co-operation towards the USA. Only recently Russia opened the Year of Chinese Culture and there will be Chinese-Russian manoeuvres at the Baikal Sea under the assumed conditions of a nuclear war. Russia plays an active role in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)31, which actually represents a new Eurasian alliance between Russia, China and other Asian states, and which might be joined by India, Pakistan and Iran. On approval of the Russian President Putin, Alexander Dubinin, geo politician and author who strongly advocates the project “Eurasia”, promotes Russia’s active and leading role within this alliance.
3. Of course the lines of Russia’s foreign political orientation under Putin became clearly visible only gradually. But you can definitely say that along with the stabilization of Russia’s inner situation and the positive economic development the Russian foreign policy became clearly more active, more intense and more self-confident.
a)    A certain climax of this development was marked by Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference.32
b)    Here Putin frankly opposed the USA’s striving for the creation of a uni-polar world order, in which only one state takes the decisions. He criticised the continuing militarization of US-American foreign policy, and called for the adherence to international law (“Using violence is only legitimate if it is based on a Security Council resolution”). And he turned against the USA’s intentions to establish a so-called missile defence system in Poland and Czechia.
c)    This speech was met with a huge echo internationally. It was misunderstood as a “Start of a new cold war” or was directly attacked, although Putin declared that he was not going to join a new arms race and Genscher said that “Putin has just raised the questions that “we are also asking”.33 In the mean time the issue of establishing parts of the missile defence system in Europe has become object of many reflections in the NATO and also a topic of home politics discussed in Germany.
d)    In Russia the speech met with approval, in particular Putin’s self confidant demeanour. But the opinion was also voiced that Putin would hardly do more than protest.
e)    General Leonid Ivashov, Vice President of the Russian Academy for Geopolitical Affairs said that Iran had to prepare itself for defence against a nuclear attack. In case it happened, however, Russia would confine itself to merely condemn the attacks (“The United States made a mistake”) but would maintain that the victim had itself provoked the attack.34 Also Daschitschev emphasizes in a contribution to the Literaturnaja Gazetta: A global attack calls for a global answer.35 Even earlier Daschitschev called the eventual stationing of American nuclear weapons in the Ukraine “Cuba reverse “.
f)    Actually one is not mistaken to assume that the Russian President gave his frank speech in Munich with the threat of a war against Iran on his mind, since voices are increasing who predict such an attack.36
g)    But in spite of this whole situation it seems that Putin will stick to the advice of his foreign policy advisor that a military conflict with the USA must be avoided; conflicts are to be solved by compromises instead. Russia’s manner in the world security council shows that it takes great effort to de-escalate risks.
4. The most recent example is Russia’s attitude towards the arrest of 15 British soldiers by Iran. Russia was responsible for the alteration of a resolution, taken by the UN Security Council, to the effect that Iran was not condemned and the release of the British soldiers was not demanded. Instead the resolution requested a quick clarification of the affair.37 Later – after a meeting with the British Ambassador in Moscow – Russia called for an “independent report” by the UN.38 This way Russia tried to steer against an escalation of the situation and to settle the affair peacefully in accordance with international law. In contrast to this attitude and these facts, “Die Welt” reported: “Putin sides with the Mullahs” and accused Iran of disregarding international law, without any verification of the facts.39 The Russian attitude is never mentioned in the reports about the release of the British soldiers, yet this was the beginning of the peaceful settling of the problem.
5. If Russia proceeds that way it would be able – in spite of the general extremely negative image that it generally has in the public of the EU – to distinguish itself as a world power, that is striving for security and peace, whereas at the same time the USA are nursing their reputation as troublemaker and source of heightened insecurity.40 If – in spite of all this – the USA wage a military attack on Iran – as many have predicted – Russia will pursue a policy of non-intervention.
The USA know all that of course and take it into account in considering their strategy. The great majority of Russia’s population will be grateful for such a policy. Russia will profit politically and economically, either by augmenting its prestige or by selling more mineral resources at higher prices or by the increasing tourism into Russia.
6. What it finally comes down to is that Russia will be an important power in the developing world order, working in direction of international security, peace and international law, but handling its own potential with great care and taking no risk.

IV. About the sense of scientific analyses

1. Scientific analyses are to present an objective, realistic picture of the situation of the topic, which is subject of their investigation. This presupposes, however, that the analyses – like every scientific work – are free of opinions.41 If these prerequisites are not given, such analysis can not meet the expectations and thus contributes to the fact that the policy makers draw erroneous consequences, which – as many examples from the past show – may lead to most negative results. Each analyst should be aware of this responsibility. That applies particularly if the obvious results of an investigation are unpleasant for one’s own opinions. The truth must nevertheless be told.
2. Some of the readers may ask themselves why I often quote the constitution, laws and courts in Russia. People often claim that Russia is far away from being a constitutional state and far from providing legal security. But this generalisation is first of all wrong, and secondly it is a typical feature of Putin’s policy to make use of legal instruments to realise his political goals. Certainly, today’s Russian constitutional state resembles more the legal state under Katharina II than a constitutional state acoording to Western European standards. We should, however, not ignore Putin’s endeavors to remain within the framework of the prevailing constitution and the laws. Unfortunately, after the death of the legal experts for eastern law such as Boris Meissner and Brunner, there are only a few active lawyers in Germany, who are concerned with Russia’s legal order as thoroughly as would be desirable.
3. Last not least this applies to the often asked question: “Who will follow Putin?” Many professional observers of the development in Russia have predominantly been concerned for the last four years with this question, however without any result.
What is absolutely certain is that according to the current constitution Putin cannot be reelected president next year. It is also certain that the constitution will not be changed, in order to create the possibility of re-election. Putin also explained that he will not go into economy but will be active in a politically influential function within the administration. Looking at the Russian constitution, we realize that all executive power is exercised by the government of the Russian federation (article 110, par. 1). Therefore the president elected on the 2 March 2008 could two weeks after his accession to office suggest Vladimir W. Putin as a candidate for the office of the chairman of the government to the Duma and on agreement of the Duma (article 111, par. 1) Putin could be appointed Prime Minister. This would certainly be “an influential position” in the administration and a reasonable taks for a former president. It would also create a personal continuity apart from conceptional continuity.

1  Noam Chomsky Hegemony or Survival: America›s Quest for Global Dominance Owl Books New York, 2004
2  W. I. Daschitschew, Moskaus Griff nach der Weltmacht, Hamburg-Berlin-Bonn 2002
3  Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy 2/10/2007; www.securityconference.de/konferenzen/rede.php
4  cf. Yearbook of the United Nations 1969, p. 953; especially chapter VII, article 43
5  The data are taken from a report of the OECD. Cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 28 Nov. 2006, p. 10
6  Russian Central Bank, January 2007 (Russian), cf. Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 13/14 January 2007
7  Constitution of the Russian Federation; www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm
8  cf. V.A. Krjazkov/L.V. Lazarev, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der Russischen Föderation, Berlin 2001
9  Sonja Margolina, Die Grenzen der Lehrmeisterei, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 13 February 2007, p. 25
10 cf. Ulrich M. Schmid, Ein alttestamentarisches Geschichtsbild, in: Neue Zürcher Zeitung of 15 March 2007, p. 25
11 He ist he author of the book „Policy of Germany’s Economic Order“, Moscow 2002 (Russian)
12 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 12 March 2007, p. 3
13 ibid.
14 Beresowki’s ‚denial’ a day later served the only purpose to prevent the Russian General Attorney from demanding the revocation of Beresowki’s asylum status from Britain. Cf. Russland Aktuell, 13 April 2007
15 ibid.
16 cf. K.K. Gasanova/A.S. Prudnikova, Voters’ Rights (Russian) which gives a survey of valid normative acts.
17 Lilia Schewzowa, Putins Vermächtnis, in: Russlands Renaissance – Zeitschrift für internationale Politik, Vol 7, 2006, p. 38-46
18 cf. Margarete Mommsen, Wer herrscht in Russland?, München 2003 and the quoted sources of her analyses of Russia
19 Gernot Erler, Russland kommt, Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 2007
20 Michael Ludwig’s statements Putin’s Zugriff, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of 3 April 2007, p. 1 are basically true
21 It is another story that this would rather change Russia into a state based on law à la Catherine II instead of a legal state according to western European models. However, ignoring this typical feature of Putin’s policy would be a mistake. This is where a debate should be started. About the problem of „Rule of Law“ cf Hans Hattenauer, Europäische Rechtsgeschichte, Heidelberg 1999, no. 1463, 1464 and 2209
22 Wolfgang Seiffert, Selbstbestimmt, Graz 2006, p. 173
23 Wolfang Seiffert, Wladimir W. Putin – Wiedergeburt einer Weltmacht?, München 2000, p. 84-87
24 ibid,. P. 103
25 Wladimir W. Putin Russia at the turn of the Millenium www.geocities.com/capitolhill/parliament/3005/poutine.html
26 Seiffert, Wolfgang, Ibid., p. 87-94
27 See for instance: Mommsen, ibid., p. 225
28 Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 5.5.2006, p. 3
29 Scholl-Latour, Peter, Russland im Zangengriff, Berlin 2006.
30 cf: Mettke, J., Bär mit Balalaika, in: Der Spiegel 1/2006, p.86-90
31 cf: “The Shanghai Copperation Organisation”, in Kasachstan KZ, 17.05.2004
32 cf FN3
33 cf: Tagesspiegel 13.02.2007-10-05
34 Ivashov, Leonid, “Iran must get ready to defend itself against a nuclear attack,” in: Zeitfragen, 01.03.2007 (German)
35 Daschitschew, Wjatscheslaw, A global Answer to a global reply, in: Literaturnaja gazetta 14-20.3.2007 (Russian)
36 McGovern, Ray, Wake Up! The Next War Is Coming, in: www.informationsclearinghouse/BBC 20.02.2007
37 Spiegel Online, 31 March 2007
38 ibid.
39 Die Welt, 31 March 2007 p. 1
40 As to the economic down trend of the USA compare Buckler, William A.M., The USA have lost their economic superiority, in: the Privateer, No 345, 03 April 2007
41 Seiffert, Wolfgang, Wladimir W. Putin, ibid, p.106

*Born in 1926, Wolfgang Seiffert was professor for international economic law and international law in East Berlin until 1978. Later he moved to the Federal Republic of Germany and worked at the Institut for East European Law at Kiel University until 1994. Since his retirement he teaches Russian and European law in Moscow.